In God We Trust; All Others Who Enter This Store Are Subject to Surveillance by Springer, Karen A.
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 48 | Issue 1 Article 8
12-1995
In God We Trust; All Others Who Enter This Store
Are Subject to Surveillance
Karen A. Springer
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the
Fourth Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Springer, Karen A. (1995) "In God We Trust; All Others Who Enter This Store Are Subject to Surveillance," Federal Communications
Law Journal: Vol. 48: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol48/iss1/8
In God We Trust; All Others Who
Enter This Store Are Subject to
Surveillancet
Karen A. Springer*
INTRODUCTION ................................ 188
I. AUDIO SURVEILLANCE ARRIVES AT FIvE DUNKIN' DONUTS 191
II. A FAILED ATTEMPT To REGULATE WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE192
H. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE 1H................ 193
A. Underlying Goals of Title III .................. 193
B. Why Title III Applies to Dunkin' Donuts ........... 194
C. What Title III Prohibits ...................... 195
D. Those Exempt from the Prohibitions ............ 195
IV. ANALYSIS OF TITLE III ....................... 196
A. When Does a Private Conversation Qualify as an Oral
Communication? ......................... 196
1. The Subjective Expectation ............... 197
2. The Objective Expectation ................. 197
a. The Unambiguous Language of Section 2510(2) 197
b. Katz Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Has
There Been a Knowing Exposure? ......... 200
c. Katz Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: "What
Has Technology Wrought?" .............. 203
d. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Do They Exist
t See Robert G. Boehmer, ArtificialMonitoring and Surveillance of Employees: The
Fine Line Dividing the Prudently Managed Enterprise from the Modern Sweatshop, 41
DEPAUL L. REv. 739, 770, n.161 (1992) (discussing a July 3, 1990 telephone interview
with Lou Gerber, legislative director of the Communications Workers of America, who said
that many employers appear to have as their motto, "In God we trust. Others we monitor.")
* B.A. (English) with high distinction, B.A. (Journalism) with high distinction,
Indiana University-Bloomington, 1993; candidate for J.D. Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington, December 1995. My special thanks to David Schwartz for his
encouragement; to James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law Craig M. Bradley and
Associate Professor of Law Fred H. Cate for their constructive comments; and to Ginger
and her father for their continued moral support throughout law school.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
in Fitting Rooms? .................... 205
B. Does the Consent Exception Apply to the Interception of
This Oral Communication? ................... 206
1. Adequate Notice and the Fitting-Room Standards 207
2. Adequate Notice and the Wire Communications
Standards .. .......................... 208
C. Has Dunkin' Donuts Intentionally Intercepted the Oral
Communications of Its Customers? ............. 210
1. Intentional Conduct Requires a Conscious Objective 210
2. Intentional Conduct Does Not Consider Underlying
Motives ............................. 212
V. PROBLEMS WITH TITLE I[I ENFORCEMENT .............. 213
CONCLUSION ................................. 216
INTRODUCTION
Until May 1994, Americans had reason to believe that doughnut shops
were bastions of friendliness and safety. Where else, after all, can one
enjoy both a cup of coffee and the security of police officers at virtually
any hour? Then, over Memorial Day weekend, the illusion was shattered
when a story broke: At some East Coast Dunkin' Donuts, the "walls have
ears" I-in the form of hidden microphones that record not only customer
purchases but their private conversations as well.2
Used by some Dunkin' Donuts to prevent theft and monitor customer
service at the point of sale, the surveillance equipment could pick up
conversations from a distance of thirty feet.' This news surprised
customers in two microphone-equipped Dunkin' Donuts in Concord, New
Hampshire. "It sounds like Nazism or the KGB. It's not American," said
Nick Hondrogen. "Many times you say things to close friends you don't
want overheard." 4
But caveat emptor: Businesses might be eavesdropping on customers
as they speak. No longer content with the commonplace surveillance
cameras and anti-shoplifting mirrors, store owners have resorted to
1. Hillary Chura, Fly in Your Soup? How About a Bug in Your Booth?, L.A. TIMES
(Bulldog Ed.), May 29, 1994, at A2.
2. Randolph Ryan, Legality of Hidden Mikes at Businesses Questioned, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 27, 1994, at 1. On May 26, the Concord Monitor first reported the installation
of audio surveillance systems at hundreds of Dunkin' Donuts stores. Tom Coakley & Sean
P. Murphy, Dunkin'Donuts to Stop Recording, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 1994, at 1, 6. A
New Hampshire security firm was credited with the installation of 500 systems in
restaurants and businesses across the Northeast. Id. at 6.
3. Ryan, supra note 2, at 1.
4. Chura, supra note 1, at A2.
[Vol. 48
IN GOD WE TRUST
surreptitious audio monitoring of their employees and customers. 5
Concealed microphones lurk in department store clothing racks, supermar-
kets, retail and convenience stores, and fast-food restaurants.6 Yet, until
the surveillance practices of Dunkin' Donuts were exposed, even consumer-
privacy advocates knew little about such practices.7 Despite the onslaught
of negative publicity, audio surveillance will continue, warns one
electronics company executive.8 "[U]ntil ... there is minimal crime in
this country, . . . store owners are going to have these devices to protect
their employees and their customers," said Lewis Weiss, Chief Executive
Officer of Louroe Electronics of Van Nuys, California.9
Indeed, the trend is not toward pulling the plug on hidden bugs. 0
One report analyzing private-sector markets for security surveillance and
monitoring equipment predicted a $4 billion industry by 1998.1 That
represents an 8.6 percent annual increase in the demand for sophisticated
equipment that includes closed-circuit television (CCTV) and listening
devices. 2 According to the publisher of the report, one of the best
opportunities for equipment sales lies in the business-services sector due to
its high losses. 3
If businesses continue to engage in surreptitious audio surveillance, 4
however, they risk combatting crime with crime. Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title I)' 5 establishes
national standards to regulate the use of electronic surveillance, and those
5. Peter T. Kilborn, In a Growing Number of Stores, Hidden Security MicrophonesAre
Listening, N.Y. TimS, May 28, 1994, at A6.
6. Id. McDonald's apparently declines to follow the trend. "It [audio surveillance] is
just not something that we do," said company spokeswoman Ann Connolly. Id.
7. Id.
8. Chura, supra note 1, at A2.
9. Id.
10. The term "bug" denotes a hidden microphone that intercepts conversations and
other sounds occurring in a given space, as distinguished from a wiretap, which intercepts
telephone conversations occurring on a given line. Both bugs and wiretaps allow the
interceptor to overhear and record conversations from a remote location. See HERMAN
SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE 19 (1977).
11. Equipment Demand Grows, SEc. MGMT., Sept. 1994, at 20, 20 (quoting EDWARD
HESTER, STUDY #591 SECURITY SURVEILLANCE & MONITORING).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Surveillance in the workplace connotes general "observation to determine employee
behaviors and personal characteristics." It is distinguished from workplace monitoring,
which is undertaken to determine whether an employee has completed an assigned task
appropriately. Robert G. Boehmer, Artifical Monitoring and Surveillance of Employees: The
Fine Line Dividing the Prudently Managed Enterprise from the Modern Sweatshop, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 739, 749 (1992).
15. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
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standards are to be strictly construed.16 Title III sets forth baseline
requirements, and individual states may enact their own equally or more
stringent laws.17 As of 1991, all but four states prohibit, except under
specific circumstances, the interception of oral, wire, and electronic
communications by both law enforcement and the private sector." The
state of New Hampshire, where the Dunkin' Donuts surveillance was
uncovered, has a wiretap statute even more restrictive than Title 111.19
While the security measures employed at Dunkin' Donuts may be
common in businesses that suffer high cash and product losses, their use
in what should be speech-friendly establishments strikes as egregious
conduct. Ron Tudor, an agent with the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement, said it best when he described his reaction to the audio
surveillance at Dunkin' Donuts: "I have what I consider a reasonable
expectation of privacy when I sit down in the booth of a restaurant. I
shouldn't have to worry about someone listening in on my conversa-
tion. "I
Using the Dunkin' Donuts setting for purposes of analysis, this Note
examines the standards established by Title Ill. Part I of this Note provides
specifics as to the audio surveillance used by Dunkin' Donuts. Part II offers
a brief overview of the latest failed attempt to regulate surveillance in the
workplace. Part III presents the legislative history of Title IH. Part IV
applies the operative statutory language to the Dunkin' Donuts scenario.
Part V examines problems with the enforcement of Title III. This Note
concludes that, as a consumer, Ron Tudor should not have to worry about
businesses furtively recording his personal conversations, but he may have
little choice. The insidious nature of bugging makes violations of Title I
difficult to detect. Further, even if detected, those violations may offer little
in the way of adverse consequences to violators. As a result, bugs continue
to multiply. Short of carrying a "countersurveillance probe/monitor" to
16. United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
990 (1974).
17. Id.
18. Those four states are Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and Vermont. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS-1992 159 (1992).
19. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (1994). This statute provides that a third party
who intercepts an oral or wire communication without the consent of all parties to the
communication commits a class B felony. Id. Section 570-A:2 requires the consent of all
parties to the communication, whereas Title I requires the consent of only one party. Id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994).
20. Tiny ears may be listening: Stores plant mikes as anti-theft devices, SUN SENTINEL
(Fort Lauderdale), May 28, 1994, at 3A.
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detect lurking bugs,2 consumers enter our nation's stores armed with little
more than ineffective statutory prohibitions to combat the creeping
phenomenon of private-sector bugging.
I. AuDIo SURVEILLANCE ARRIvES AT FrvE DuNKiN' DoNuTs
Around October 1993, five Dunkin' Donut franchises in New
Hampshire contracted with an in-state security firm for the purchase and
installation of surveillance equipment as part of their ongoing loss-
prevention measures.' The equipment consisted of four cameras and one
microphone having the capacity, according to those who purchased it, "to
produce [an] audio recording of employees' conversations and, in some
instances, of customers" in each store.' The two officers and/or directors
of the franchises claim to have purchased the equipment upon their belief
that audio recording was legal in New Hampshire.'
As of May 27, 1994, each franchise had approximately twenty-one
tapes in use.' What was recorded on those tapes depended upon camera
locations, the level of background noise, and the volume of the speakers'
voices.' Although the franchise representatives denied intending to record
their customers' conversations, they did not deny having in fact done so.'
The audio surveillance continued for approximately six months until a
curious customer inquired about the operation of the video cameras.2
That customer-who was merely looking to buy a cup of coffee and a
Boston "kreme" doughnut-happened to be an investigator for New
Hampshire's Consumer Protection and Antitrust Bureau.29 He found a
surveillance system that "pretty clearly picked up" the conversations of
customers in areas far removed from the checkout counter.30 In addition
to a master audio pickup located near the cash register, each of the four
21. See Surveillance Countermeasures, SEC. MGMT., Oct. 1994, at 26, 26 (advertising
surveillance countermeasure products).
22. Agreement Letter from Matthew Donuts, Inc., to Jeffrey R. Howard, New
Hampshire Attorney General 1 (June 1, 1994) [hereinafter Agreement Letter] (on file with
the State of New Hampshire, Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General,
Concord, N.H.).
23. Id. at 1-2.
24. Id. at 1.
25. Id. at 2.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Telephone Interview with Walter L. Maroney, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Consumer Protection and Antitrust Bureau, Office of the Attorney General for the State of
New Hampshire (Aug. 10, 1995).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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mounted cameras had standard audio components and the ability to pan the
entire shop.
IL A FAILED ATTEMPT TO REGULATE WORKPLACE
SURVEILLANCE
While this Note does not focus upon the evils of employee surveil-
lance in the workplace, practices directed at employees obviously affect
customers. Unfortunately, while Congress makes repeated attempts to
regulate workplace surveillance, 32 it remains indifferent to the plight of
consumers.
The latest unsuccessful attempt to regulate workplace surveillance
appeared as House Bill 190011 and Senate Bill 984,1 the Privacy for
Consumers and Workers Act. Despite its name, the Act had little to do
with protecting consumer privacy. The content of the bills-and their
ultimate defeat-demonstrates the lobbying power behind retail, security,
and restaurant interests. These very interests, of course, promote and use
covert electronic surveillance as a loss-prevention measure. As a result,
they represent a significant threat to privacy for consumers and the
remedial effects of Title Il.
The Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act received vehement
criticism for overbreadth by retail 5 and security lobbyists.3  Further
criticism caused Representative Pat Williams (D-Mont.) to modify House
Bill 1900 "to accommodate the reasonable concerns" voiced by the
National Restaurant Association and the National Association of Conve-
nience Stores. 7 However, even in its original form, the Act virtually
endorsed the covert audio surveillance utilized by Dunkin' Donuts. As
introduced, Section 9 of the bill regarding privacy protections provided:
(2) EXCEPTION.-Electronic monitoring by an employer whose
purpose and principal effect is to collect data about the work of
an employee or to collect data on subjects who are not employees
31. Id.
32. Teresa Anderson, Legal Reporter, SEC. MGMT., Dec. 1994, at 70, 73.
33. H.R. 1900, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
34. S. 984, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
35. Read Hayes, Passage of employee monitoring bill would be a true loss, DISCOUNT
STORE NEWS, May 16, 1994, at 118, 118.
36. The Security Companies Organized for Legislative Action (SCOLA) petitioned the
Senate for a total security exemption that would exclude practices designed to protect
employees and property. Teresa Anderson, Is Electronic Monitoring Getting the Plug
Pulled?, SEC. MGMT., Oct. 1993, at 73, 73.
37. Restaurants and convenience stores insisted upon having the ability to collect and
compare point-of-sale data. Pat Williams, Privacy bill to limit, not prohibit, electronic
surveillance in marketplace, DISCOUNT STORE NEWS, May 16, 1994, at 120, 120.
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of the employer is not prohibited ... because it incidentally
collects data which is not confined to such employee's work. 3
8
Further, the public-notice requirement contained in House Bill 1900
acknowledges both the lack of a surveillance prohibition upon employers
and the resultant encroachment on customer conversations. Recognizing the
spillover, the requirement provided for notice reasonably calculated to
reach members of the public included in or affected by the employer's
electronic monitoring. 39 This notice requirement serves as the only
acknowledgment in House Bill 1900 of any kind of consumer privacy
interest.
Security professionals discounted even that small interest as they
insisted that privacy take a back seat to safety. In its September 1993
position statement to Congress, the American Society for Industrial
Security (ASIS) said that "[t]he nation's security professionals feel that the
debate over electronic monitoring should center on the public's safety and
security rather than on potential, and in some cases illusory, privacy abuses
that can be adequately addressed by existing federal and state laws. "I
Clearly, the interests that utilize and promote covert audio surveillance
use their considerable power to maintain the bugging status quo.
Consumers must look over their shoulders-and backward in time-for
protection from furtive bugs. To evaluate the protection afforded by
existing federal law, we turn to Title I.
Ill. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE IT[
A. Underlying Goals of Title III
Despite legitimate law enforcement needs, rapid technological
advances in the 1960s created the opportunity for "widespread use and
abuse of electronic surveillance techniques" to combat organized crime.4"
In 1968, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary identified the problem as
follows: "Every spoken word relating to each man's personal, marital,
religious, political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an
unseen auditor and turned against the speaker to the auditor's advan-
tage. "42
To remedy this "intolerable" situation,43 Congress enacted Title In
38. H.R. 1900 § 9(a)(2) (emphasis added).
39. H.R. 1900 § 4(e).
40. ASIS Gives Congress Statement on Bill, SEC. MGMT., Nov. 1993, at 64, 64.
41. OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968, S. REP. No. 1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154.
42. Id. at U.S.C.C.A.N. 2154.
43. Id.
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to accommodate both law enforcement and privacy interests. Title Im has
the dual purpose of protecting the privacy of oral and wire communications
and delineating a uniform standard for authorizing the interception of those
communications" in efforts against crime.45 The Act sought to conform
electronic surveillance practices to the constitutional standards established
by the United States Supreme Court in two cases: Berger v. New YorlW
and Katz v. United States.47
B. Why Title III Applies to Dunkin' Donuts
While Title III primarily targeted the problems connected with
organized crime and unauthorized surveillance by the government, Senate
Report 1097 clearly establishes that the Act extends to electronic surveil-
lance conducted by the private sector. "To assure the privacy of oral and
wire communications, IMitle III prohibits all wiretapping and electronic
surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers.
. 8" There are three exceptions to this blanket prohibition. Business is
not one of them, and the omission was intentional.
In 1965, the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice & Procedure
of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the necessity of
legislation to protect individual privacy from nongovernmental surveillance.
It identified three areas of widespread electronic surveillance by nongovern-
mental actors. Subcommittee Chairman Long offered the following insight:
"The three large areas of snooping in this [nongovernmental] field are (1)
industrial, (2) divorce cases, and (3) politics. So far, we have heard no real
justification for continuance of snooping in these three areas."49 More-
44. Id. at U.S.C.C.A.N. 2153.
45. Id. at U.S.C.C.A.N. 2157.
46. Berger, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (holding a New York eavesdropping statute to be
facially unconstitutional because it lacked particularity as to the crime being investigated,
the location to be searched, and the "things" to be seized. The majority felt that the
obtrusive nature of eavesdropping made the need for specificity "especially great." Id. at
56, 58-60.).
47. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not merely places, and, thus, a lack of physical intrusion into a given enclosure will not
defeat a justifiable expectation of privacy against the interception of communications. Katz
was held to have such an expectation in the public telephone booth from which he
transmitted wagering information and to the outside of which FBI agents had attached a
listening-and-recording device. Id. at 353. Prior Supreme Court decisions required a
physical trespass before evidence obtained through law-enforcement eavesdropping could
be suppressed as the fruits of an illegal search and seizure. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)).
48. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 41, at U.S.C.C.A.N. 2153 (emphasis added).
49. Invasions of Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Prac. & Proc. of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2261 (1966)
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over, Senate Report 1097 indicates that interceptions "by private unautho-
rized hands have little justification""0 without the consent of one party to
the targeted communication. The unambiguous language of Title I itself
reflects this belief. Therefore, Title In applies to operations such as
Dunkin' Donuts.
C. What Title III Prohibits
Except as specifically provided, Title I proscribes the actual or
attempted intentional interception of wire, oral, and electronic communica-
tions as well as the disclosure or use of any communication intercepted."
For any unlawful interception, Title m prescribes criminal penalties of not
more than five years imprisonment, a fine, or both;52 civil recourse for
actual or statutory damages sustained;53 and the suppression of evidence
obtained.' Title II further proscribes (with limited exception) the
intentional manufacture, possession, mailing, or advertisement of
electronic, mechanical, or other devices known to be used primarily for the
surreptitious interception of oral, wire, or electronic communications.55
Title I does not proscribe interceptions made with consent,
regardless of whether those acting under color of law or private individuals
make the interceptions. A consensual interception by law enforcement
occurs when the government actor is a party to the intercepted communica-
tion or when a party to that communication gives prior consent.57 A
consensual interception by a private actor occurs in the same way;
however, interceptions made for the purpose of committing a criminal or
tortious act are prohibited. Accordingly, Title III prohibits Dunkin'
Donuts from making nonconsensual interceptions and consensual intercep-
tions that have a criminal or tortious purpose.
D. Those Exempt from the Prohibition
Under Title I, law enforcement personnel conducting an investiga-
tion of certain major crimes can perform wiretaps and other electronic
surveillance when they have obtained court authorization upon a showing
50. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 41, at U.S.C.C.A.N. 2156.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l)(a)-(e) (1994).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) (1994).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a)-(c) (1994).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (1994).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d) (1994).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1994).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994).
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of probable cause.59 While engaged in the ordinary course of their
business, employees of communications providers'" and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC)6 are also exempt from the prohibi-
tions of Title I. Further exempted are government officials acting under
presidential power to protect national security interests.'
IV. ANALYSIS OF TITLE III
A. When Does a Private Conversation Qualify as an Oral
Communication?
To determine whether a Title III violation has occurred, one must first
consider the nature of the intercepted communication. For Title M
purposes, an "'oral communication' is a term of art."63 The import of the
term lies in the communicator's expectations and not in the communi-
cation's oral nature.' A conversation qualifies as an oral communication
when it is "any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include
any electronic communication . . 65 Pursuant to these requirements,
a conversation held in an establishment such as Dunkin' Donuts would
generally constitute an "oral communication." Aside from the obvious
circularity of defining the term "oral communication" with the term
itself,' the operative language of Section 2510(2) is a two-prong test that
consists of a subjective and an objective expectation. The test evolved from
the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Katz,67 which involved Fourth
Amendment protections, and particularly from Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion. "[T]here is a twofold requirement," Harlan stated. "[F]irst, that
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.'"68 The subjective expectation thus represents a question of
fact, while the objective expectation represents a question of law.69
59. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (1994).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1994).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(b) (1994).
62. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(2)(e)-(f) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
63. Angel v. Williams, 12 F.3d 786, 789 n.5 (8th Cir. 1993).
64. Id.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1994).
66. Angel, 12 F.3d at 790.
67. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
68. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. Angel, 12 F.3d at 790.
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1. The Subjective Expectation
The first element of the subjective requirement-any oral communica-
tion7 --is satisfied as long as the parties communicate with spoken words.
To satisfy the second element of the subjective requirement, the conver-
sants must exhibit an actual expectation that their communication will not
be intercepted.7 If the parties have no reason to believe that Dunkin'
Donuts utilized audio surveillance, it follows that they would have an
expectation that their exchange was private. Unless they conversed in a
loud or otherwise distracting manner, they would also exhibit an expecta-
tion that their conversation would not be overheard by others nearby.
Conversation over coffee and doughnuts might well include the
intimate details of people's lives. If the speakers take care not to be
overheard by persons within sight and earshot, they surely do not expect
their conversation to be intercepted by a hidden electronic eavesdropper,
regardless of its proximity. The very nature of the conversation would
confirm the assumption of a private exchange. On this basis, the subjective
prong of the "oral communication" test is met under the Dunkin' Donuts
analysis.
2. The Objective Expectation
The objective prong of the "oral communication" test presents a
greater hurdle under Title HI, both to civil plaintiffs seeking monetary
damages and to criminal defendants seeking Fourth Amendment protection.
This hurdle often proves impossible to overcome because under its Katz
analysis, the Supreme Court takes an extremely narrow view of what
constitutes reasonable privacy expectations.
a. The Unambiguous Language of Section 2510(2)
Of what concern, one might legitimately ask, are objective expecta-
tions of privacy to a Title I analysis? The unambiguous language of
Section 2510(2) requires an expectation that the communication "is not
subject to interception. . . .," Standard rules of statutory construction
command that absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary, unambiguous
language "must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."73 Nor can it be
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1994).
71. Id.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1994) (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying note
65.
73. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (rejecting application of the
rule of lenity to an unambiguous RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962).
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ignored that Congress defined what it meant by an interception. "'[[Inter-
cept' means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device."74 A court cannot, like Humpty-Dumpty,
interpret the plain language of Section 2510(2) to mean something different
than what it says.75 The appropriate objective test under Title Im,
therefore, does not involve reasonable expectations of privacy. Rather, it
involves reasonable expectations of noninterception, which is not a
semantic distinction without a difference.
First, an expectation of noninterception imposes a different, and
arguably lesser, burden upon the party whose conversation has been
intercepted. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged this tension but was not
required to resolve it in the case of Wilker v. Darby.76 The Eleventh
Circuit expressly distinguished expectations of noninterception from those
of privacy in a civil suit brought by a postal employee against his
supervisor. Sympathetic to Walker's complaints that his employer bugged
his work station, the court said: "[W]hile Walker might have expected
conversations uttered in a normal tone of voice to be overheard by those
standing nearby, it is highly unlikely that he would have expected his
conversations to be electronically intercepted and monitored in an office in
another part of the building.'
However, the Eleventh Circuit did not reach this issue of objective
expectations of noninterception. It reversed the post office's grant of
summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings for a factual
determination as to Walker's subjective expectation.7" Even though the
court's analysis is dicta, the point is well taken that reasonable expectations
of privacy are more limited than are reasonable expectations of noninter-
ception. Because the concepts are not identical, a person may lack the
former but still have the latter.79
Second, an expectation of noninterception directs the focus away from
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994).
75. "'When I use a word,' Humpty-Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.'" Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463,
470 n. 12 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (quoting LEwIs CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND
WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 274 (Puffin Books 1962) (1871)).
76. Walker, 911 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1990).
77. Id. at 1578-79.
78. Id.
79. Wesley v. WISN Division-Hearst Corp., 806 F. Supp. 812, 814-15 (E.D. Wis.
1992) (holding no reasonable expectation of noninterception by a former radio station
account executive who conversed with a traffic reporter near a microphone at the reporter's
work station. The district court found that the existence and position of the microphone
were sufficient to put Wesley "on notice that her comments might be intercepted.").
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generalizations about the public nature of the locality to a specific
consideration of its function. While jails, for example, are not "open to the
public," the courts have held there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in them.' However, the crowded and communal conditions of our jails
do not make expectations of privacy and noninterception within them
unreasonable. Rather, because the sole purpose of a jail is to confine
known or suspected criminals, it is reasonable to expect that others will
intercept communications"1 and monitor behavior in order to protect both
inmates and their keepers. Thus, if certain types of facilities lend
themselves to the inflexible determination that an expectation of noninter-
ception will never be justified within them, the function and not the form
of the facility is determinative. As for jails, that determination also flows
from the legislative history of Title I, which declares that no expectation
of privacy exists therein.' Accordingly, appellate and state courts have
resolved this question of law against both criminal defendants' and civil
plaintiffs. 4
While Dunkin' Donuts is not a jail, neither legislative history nor
judicial precedent tidily resolves whether customers have an expectation of
noninterception in such an establishment. However, it does not stretch the
logic of either legislative history or judicial precedent to suggest that the
very function of a Dunkin' Donuts or similar operation supports an
expectation of noninterception.
When customers chat and linger over coffee, they do so at the express
80. Angel v. Williams, 12 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1993).
81. Id.
82. See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 41, at U.S.C.C.A.N. 2178 (stating that an
expectation of noninterception would be "unjustified in certain areas; for example a jail
cell").
83. United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 766 F.2d
186 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1034 (1985)
(holding that conversations between a husband and his wife during a jail visit were not "oral
communications" under Title III and could be admitted into evidence. The interceptions
were performed by a prisoner in an adjoining cell, who acted on behalf of the FBI). See
also People v. Siripongs, 754 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1988) (en banc) (holding that a murder
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy during a telephone conversation
conducted in Thai, when a police officer stood beside him during the call, nor a reasonable
expectation that the officer would not record the call for later translation), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 1019 (1989).
84. Angel, 12 F.3d at 790 (holding that city police officers who were terminated for
using excessive force on a prisoner could not prevail in their civil action against the city for
unlawful interception because the tape-recorded incident in question occurred within a
public jail. "These are the only material facts necessary to prove, as a matter of law, that
it was not objectively reasonable for the officers to expect that their conversations would
not be intercepted." Id.).
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invitation of Dunkin' Donuts, which installs booths and tables for their
dining convenience s and creates an atmosphere conducive to conversa-
tion. Accepting that invitation, customers spend more than one billion
dollars annually at Dunkin' Donuts. 6 As hoped for by Dunkin' Donuts,
customers respond to sixty million dollars worth of advertising' launched
to promote a "mainstream premium product available for the mainstream
of America.""8 In return for its patronage, that mainstream received the
shocking news that bugs had infiltrated Dunkin' Donuts. "[It is] the kind
of thing that many of us got used to if we traveled behind the Iron Curtain,
when there was an Iron Curtain," said Laurence Tribe, professor of
constitutional law at Harvard. 89 It is not, however, the kind of thing that
many of us would expect at home, particularly in an eatery that promotes
its fare and a comfortable environment in which to enjoy it. Clearly, the
very function of a Dunkin' Donuts affords its customers a reasonable
expectation of noninterception.
b. Katz Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Has There Been a
Knowing Exposure?
While noninterception analysis comports with the actual language of
Section 2510(2), that, unfortunately, is not the interpretation given to it by
the courts. Instead, courts think in terms of reasonable expectations of
privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment.' Of course, because the
Dunkin' Donuts interceptors are private as opposed to government actors,
Fourth Amendment protections are not implicated. Still, Title Ill was
modeled upon the constitutional standards established in Katz9' that:
"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected. "I Thus, the inquiry becomes whether Dunkin'
85. Kerry Hannon, Two doughnuts and a martini, please, FORBES, Mar. 9, 1987, at
128, 130.
86. Seth Lubove, Coffee versus Gazebo Blend, FORBES, June 20, 1994, at 112, 112.
As the nation's largest retailer of doughnuts and freshly brewed coffee, Dunkin' Donuts
experienced 15 consecutive years of increased revenues and earnings prior to its 1989
takeover by Allied-Lyons Plc., a British distiller. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Jack Shafer, president of Dunkin' Donuts U.S.A.).
89. Ryan, supra note 2, at 1.
90. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, which provides that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . .. ."
91. See Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
92. Id. at 351-52.
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Donuts customers who converse as they eat have knowingly and sufficiently
exposed statements to outsiders so as to render those communications
subject to interception and hence not "oral communications" within the
meaning of the statute.
Following Justice Harlan's Katz concurrence, courts have generally
found that "conversations in the open would not be protected against being
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would
be unreasonable."' For example, the Seventh Circuit in In re John Doe
Trader Number One held that a trader on the floor of the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
statements he made to an undercover FBI agent wearing a concealed tape
recorder. 4 The court found Doe to have assumed the risk that his
statements would be overheard and recorded.95 There is, however, nothing
remarkable about the court's reasoning or its conclusion. The agent who
recorded Doe's remarks was either a participant to the conversations or
stood within earshot of them. Because the agent was wearing the concealed
recorder, it followed him and essentially "heard" the same things the agent
heard.
The Dunkin' Donuts fact pattern is distinguishable from In re John
Doe Trader Number One, however, and the differences are key to the
analysis. The Dunkin' Donuts interceptor is not a participant in the
conversation; the interception is similar to one made by a third person who
is not within the earshot or eyesight of the conversants. As a result, the
normal precautions used to guard against being overheard are not available
to Dunkin' Donuts customers.96 For this reason, they simply cannot be
said to have assumed the risk, as did Doe, that their conversations would
be overheard and, thus, able to be recorded. This distinction alone places
a conversation held in a Dunkin' Donuts squarely outside the In re John
Doe Trader Number One rationale and within the realm of concerns voiced
by Justice Harlan nearly twenty-five years ago: "[lit is one thing to subject
the average citizen to the risk that participants in a conversation with him
will subsequently divulge its contents to another, but quite a different
matter to foist upon him the risk that unknown third parties may be
simultaneously listening in. "I
93. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
94. In re John Doe Trader Number One, 894 F.2d 240, 245 (7th Cir. 1990).
95. Id.
96. Louis B. Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wiretapping, 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 157, 162-67 (1954).
97. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 777 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting), reh'g
denied, 402 U.S. 990 (1971).
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The emphasis in In re John Doe Trader Number One that either
participant to a conversation is free to later relay its contents misses the
mark in the case of Dunkin' Donuts: It fails to address the nature of third-
party interceptions. Blackstone long ago said that, "eaves-droppers, or such
as listen under walls or windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after
discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales, are a
common nuisance.""8 Moreover, Justice Holmes condemned the practice
as "such dirty business."" When Justice Harlan distinguished between
third-party and participant interceptions in United States v. White,' he
recognized a crucial factor that the plurality appeared to overlook: A
greater invasion of privacy occurs when the contents of an oral communica-
tion have been intercepted by a nonparty than if one of the participants later
repeats any portion of that conversation.' 01
Further compounding the injury of third-party interceptions is the
increased possibility of negative results. Communication would be
inhibited, Justice Harlan contended, if one's conversations were thought to
be at risk of full recording and accurate transcription."°1 This logic
squares with the rules of evidence governing the inadmissibility, with
certain exceptions, of hearsay testimony at trial: Error and oversight are
inherent in the way humans report and especially repeat information. Cold
reliability, on the other hand, is the threat represented by the recording and
ultimate verbatim reporting of a conversation. Such a threat can effectively
chill communications when speakers understand that their every word may
be repeated verbatim-both to persons and by persons in whom they did
not intend to confide. Justice Harlan addressed this concern when he said:
"Were third-party bugging a prevalent practice, it might well smother that
spontaneity-reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant
discourse-that liberates daily life.""0 3
Certainly, an innocent conversation between friends, family members,
98. Ralph S. Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case
in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 169 (1969) (quoting 4 W. BLACKS'rONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *168).
99. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
overruled by Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
100. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
101. Id. at 746-47 (plurality opinion) (holding that a criminal defendant's Fourth Amend-
ment rights were not violated by the admission of testimony from two narcotics agents, in
lieu of testimony from a missing informant, as to contents of conversations that occurred
between the defendant and the informant, in the informant's home. Those conversations
were monitored by the agents with the informant's consent through the use of a radio
transmitter concealed on the informant and by one agent having been concealed in a closet).
102. Id. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
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or business associates who linger over coffee in a Dunkin' Donuts falls
squarely within the categories of discourse that Justice Harlan sought to
protect. And just as certainly, informal conversation between intimates
often contains agreeable falsehoods, exaggerations, obscenities, and even
antisocial views that the speaker does not expect to be taken seriously."'
Yet, a greater disclosure than was intended can serve not only to embarrass
the speaker but may lead to adverse consequences such as the loss of
respect, or a job, or friends." 5 The threat thus represented by third-party
interception can only inhibit the communications upon which personal
relationships depend.' Such a result is neither intended by Title III nor
desirable as a matter of social policy.
c. Katz Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: "What has
Technology Wrought? " "
Another issue related to the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
analysis is the extent to which it has been influenced by technological
advances in surveillance techniques. 0 s In the Fourth Amendment criminal
context, the United States Supreme Court has demonstrated a considerable
tolerance for electronic intrusions and a concomitant intolerance for what
individuals therefore "knowingly expose" to the public."° As a result, an
individual's "'knowing exposure' may be entirely inadvertent or the result
of continuing advances and applications of new surveillance ... techno-
logies.""" Thus, criminal defendants have been found to have no reason-
able expectations of privacy against governmental intrusion in the telephone
numbers they dial;"' in opaque, closed garbage bags left on a residential
sidewalk for collection;"' or in a backyard marijuana crop concealed by
104. Schwartz, supra note 96, at 162.
105. R. Kent Greenawalt, Privacy and Its Legal Protection, 2 HASTINGS CENTER STUD.
45, 50, 59-60 (1974) reprinted in MoNRAD G. PAULSEN, THE PROBLEMS OF ELECTRONIC
EAVESDROPPING 6-11 (1977).
106. Id.
107. Spritzer, supra note 98, at 180.
108. Id.
109. Don Mayer, Workplace Privacy and the Fourth Amendment: An End to Reasonable
Expectations?, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 625 (1992).
110. Id. at 637.
111. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (upholding the placement, without a
warrant, of a "pen register" to record numbers dialed from defendant's telephone).
112. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (upholding warrantless search of
garbage for evidence of narcotics use because "bags left on or at the side of a public street
are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the
public").
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a fence that could not be seen through or over."3
Of course, these cases differ from Dunkin' Donuts because they
involve Fourth Amendment protections for criminal defendants and
electronic surveillance other than eavesdropping. However, it does not
advance the analysis to consider different standards of reasonableness for
criminal and civil complainants. First, the suggestion that the laws should
accord lesser privacy expectations to those who engage in criminal behavior
ignores a powerful argument that criminal defendants should receive greater
leeway to balance the force of governmental power brought to bear upon
them. However, it is troublesome to suggest that civil plaintiffs, being
innocent of criminal wrongdoing, should not have their legitimate
expectations of privacy recognized. Second, and more important, the
criminal/civil distinction does not affect the outcome because the United
States Supreme Court has afforded civil plaintiffs the same constricted
expectations of privacy as criminal defendants.
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,"' the Supreme Court denied
Dow any Fourth Amendment protection from Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) aerial surveillance and telephotography of land adjacent to
a company plant. Consistent with its members-of-the-general-public
rationale utilized in criminal cases, the Court concluded that the EPA's
$22,000 aerial mapping camera was not "some unique sensory device that,
for example, could penetrate the walls of buildings and record conversa-
tions in Dow's plants, offices, or laboratories, but rather a conventional,
albeit precise, commercial camera commonly used in mapmaking."115
Thus, the Court's understanding of "reasonable expectations of privacy"
does not depend upon the civil or criminal nature of the proceeding.
Rather, it appears to depend upon whether the general public could lawfully
discover, with the aid of "non-unique" sensory devices, that which another
seeks to protect as private."1 6 In effect, the Court ignores whether a given
technology "places individuals at risk of involuntary exposure that exceeds
113. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (upholding search warrant
obtained based upon police officer's observation of crop from a private plane flying at 1000
feet over defendant's house. The Court concluded that "[a]ny member of the public flying
in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers ob-
served"). See also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (upholding search warrant
obtained based upon state agent's observance of greenhouse-concealed marijuana crop from
a helicopter flying at 400 feet).
114. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
115. Id. at 238. The Court also based its denial upon the "open fields" exception, which
limits Fourth Amendment protection to areas within the "curtilage" of a premises. Id. at
235-39.
116. Mayer, supra note 109, at 643.
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generally acceptable social norms."11 The Court also relieves the
interceptor from demonstrating both its need for and benefit from the
invasive practice.118
If this members-of-the-general-public analysis were applied to Dunkin'
Donuts, however, the pendulum would swing in favor of the intercepted
party. That is because while the law does not prohibit the general public
from flying at FAA-approved altitudes and observing whatever lies below,
it does prohibit the general public from intercepting oral communications
without prior consent.1 9 Accordingly, Dunkin' Donuts customers do not
"knowingly expose" the contents of their conversations to the public underKatz. 12
d. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Do They Exist in Fitting
Rooms?
Fitting-room cases stand for two propositions of particular appli-
cability to the Dunkin' Donuts Title II analysis. As it pertains to the
objective prong of the "oral communication" test, a customer's reasonable
expectation of privacy in a business establishment depends upon common
habits in the use of the property as well as upon the particular circum-
stances.12 1 In both criminal prosecutions of a customer and civil actions
against a retailer, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis focuses on
the propriety of the fitting-room surveillance and not its results. Propriety
and the reasonableness of the customer's expectation are questions of fact
that require inquiry into the particular circumstances and the obvious
conditions of the room.
Thus, in In re Deborah C.,1 2 the California Supreme Court held
that a juvenile shoplifter had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
fitting room where two-foot gaps above and below the door allowed for her
activities to be observed by a store detective who stood in a normal
position in the corridor." Citing the configuration of the fitting-room
door, the court reasoned that "[t]hough designed perhaps to give minimal
protection to modesty, the doors hardly could promote any reasonable
feeling that all actions and objects behind them were insulated from public
117. Id. at 660.
118. Id.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994). See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
120. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
121. In re Deborah C., 635 P.2d 446, 452 (Cal. 1981) (en banc).
122. 635 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1981).
123. Id. at 451.
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observation.""2
Dunkin' Donuts customers, however, do not seek to insulate
themselves from public observation by persons who have a right to be
where they are. Neither do those customers seek Title II protection from
being overheard by persons who have assumed normal positions nearby.
Rather, Dunkin' Donuts customers seek insulation from hidden micro-
phones that intercept their private conversations. As one fitting-room court
stated, "protection... extends only to the limits that the design, purpose
and plan of the public facility affords . . . ."" Protection extends,
therefore, to the conversations of customers in Dunkin' Donuts. They have
a reasonable expectation of privacy because the design, purpose, and plan
of a Dunkin' Donuts afford it." The rationale of another fitting-room
case, Ohio v. McDaniel,27 further supports that expectation:
Even though the customer may be aware, and may be deemed to
have consented, to the possible intrusion into her privacy by the
inadvertence of another customer or by a salesclerk who intends
to assist the customer, the customer using the fitting room has a
reasonable expection [sic] that her privacy will not be invaded by
an intruding eye from a concealed vantage point.In
Likewise, the customers of Dunkin' Donuts seek to preserve their
conversational privacy in areas not totally closed off from the public. In so
doing, they have a reasonable expectation that their privacy will not be
invaded by an intruding ear that eavesdrops from a concealed vantage
point. Accordingly, the objective prong of the "oral communication" test
has been satisfied. Conversations held in a Dunkin' Donuts qualify as "oral
communications" for purposes of Title III.
B. Does the Consent Exception Apply to the Interception of this
Oral Communication?
As previously noted, Title III generally allows interceptions made
when one party to the communication consents. 29 Dunkin' Donuts cannot
claim party status to a private conversation between customers. Therefore,
in order to lawfully intercept a communication, Dunkin' Donuts must
obtain prior consent from any conversing party. Title 111 has been held to
afford a safe harbor for interceptors acting with either explicit or implied
124. Id. at 452.
125. Gillett v. Texas, 588 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
126. Cf. Id.
127. McDaniel, 337 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
128. Id. at 177.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994). See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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consent. 130
1. Adequate Notice and the Fitting-Room Standards
The second proposition evident from the fitting-room cases is the
requirement of adequate notice of surveillance techniques before any
implied consent can be imputed to the customer.13 1 Adequate notice in the
fitting-room context requires either a prominently placed warning,13 1 or
some obvious physical condition of the premises that would make a privacy
expectation unreasonable. 33 Fitting-room cases focus upon knowledge
available to the customer. Under this standard, Dunkin' Donuts has failed
to provide the requisite notice to its customers.
Emphasizing knowledge available to the customer, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals held that no expectation of privacy was violated by a
department-store security officer who, while on all fours and peering under
a fitting-room door, observed a customer place a sweater in her purse.134
The reason, the court said, was a prominently placed surveillance notice:
[Tihe posted sign on the mirror which would under nearly all
circumstances be looked at by female occupants of a fitting room
was notice that one could not expect privacy. This room was for
use by the public on conditions established by the business. If
appellant did not want to use the fitting room under the posted
conditions, she was not compelled to do so.13
Not surprisingly then, the lack of any surveillance notice affords an
expectation of privacy to a shoplifter observed under similar
circumstances. 36  Finally, the existence of prominently located
surveillance warnings served to defeat the expectation of privacy by a civil
complainant. In Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 3 overhead surveillance
by a same-sex security guard was not held to invade a customer's privacy
when an undercover police officer was detained upon observation that he
carried a gun in the fitting room.13 1
The notice provided by Dunkin' Donuts consisted of an entry-door
sticker that advised "[a]udio monitoring on premises." 13  With good
130. Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990).
131. McDaniel, 337 N.E.2d at 173.
132. Gillett v. Texas, 588 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). See also
McDaniel, 337 N.E.2d at 173.
133. In re Deborah C., 635 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1981) (en banc).
134. Gillett, 588 S.W.2d at 363.
135. Id.
136. McDaniel, 337 N.E.2d at 173.
137. Lewis, 339 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
138. Id. at 858, 860-61.
139. Kilborn, supra note 5, at A6.
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reason, the sufficiency of that "warning" has been questioned by at least
one security systems provider,"4 as well as by the Consumer Protection
Bureau of the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office.' 41 According
to Senior Assistant Attorney General Walter L. Maroney, the single small
sticker utilized by Dunkin' Donuts was insufficient for two reasons. First,
it was printed in English but used in two communities (Manchester and
Concord) that have Spanish- and French-speaking populations. Second, the
placement of the sticker was too far removed from the points of actual
interception. 4 z While Maroney's office does not issue written guidelines
as to what constitutes sufficient notice, he does suggest that the warning
would have to be "large enough that it would conceivably be seen" and
placed "in real proximity to legitimate [interception] locations."143
A small sticker placed on the entry door of a Dunkin' Donuts hardly
compares with the surveillance warning prominently displayed on
individual fitting-room mirrors. Even assuming that customers actually see
the notice and can read it, the advice "[a]udio monitoring on premises" is
ambiguous at best. It does not inform customers that the conversations held
in their individual booths are subject to electronic surveillance. Further,
there is no open and obvious condition in a Dunkin' Donuts premises that
would suggest to customers the existence of, or need for, audio surveil-
lance. As one customer in a Massachusetts Dunkin' Donuts commented
about that store's video cameras: "There can't be anything in here worth
stealing that's worth half the cost of those cameras." " Finally, whereas
retail fitting rooms are known for their role in shoplifting capers, doughnut
shop booths are not.
Under the fitting-room case standards, Dunkin' Donuts has failed to
adequately warn customers about its use of electronic surveillance. Without
that warning, customers have not given their implied consent to any
electronic eavesdropping.
2. Adequate Notice and the Wire Communications Standards
While the standards established by cases involving wire communica-
tions have not been previously considered, they serve as a point of
140. According to Jeffrey Meuse, owner of National Security Video, Inc., of Goffstown,
New Hampshire, manufacturers of the surveillance equipment enclose notice stickers in
their shipments. "The question," Meuse said, "is whether the stickers are noticed." Id.
141. Telephone Interview with Walter L. Maroney, supra note 28.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Ryan, supra note 2, at 24 (quoting customer Rick Foster of Hyde Park,
Massachusetts).
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reference on the question of consent. In the case of wire communications,
the safe harbor of Title I has been buttressed by the belief that Congress
intended a broad construction of the consent requirement.14 Notwith-
standing congressional intent, the prophylactic purpose of Title HI suggests
that consent should not be casually inferred."4 Similar to the case of oral
communications, a finding of implied consent for the interception of a wire
communication will depend upon what reasonably constitutes adequate
notice. Implied consent was found where 'an interceptor's repeated
announcement of her intent to monitor all incoming calls gave the
tenant/complainant "considerably more than a mere expectation that his call
might, or probably would, be monitored." 47 Likewise, continued use of
prison telephones by inmates who received notice of an interception policy
from at least four sources constituted their implied consent to the
monitoring. '4
In contrast, implied consent has not been extended to the interception
of an entire personal call where an employee expressly consented to the
limited monitoring of her sales calls. 49 Similarly, there has been no
implied consent to monitoring where the record did not reflect that an
executive officer had been informed of either the manner in which the
monitoring was to be conducted or that he personally would be moni-
tored."s Finally, no consent could be implied from circumstances
reflecting that an employee suspected of burglary had knowledge only that
her calls might or could be monitored, not that they actually would be."
Applying these holdings to the case of Dunkin' Donuts reflects that
even the broadest construction of the consent requirement does not support
an inference of customer consent to the surveillance of personal table talk.
At best, a warning sticker on the premises door signifies the company's
capacity for surveillance, not an intent to engage in it. Such circumstances
have been held insufficient to imply consent by both the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits."2 Nor does one sign on a general access door inform
any particular customer that his or her conversations may be the target of
surveillance or, in fact, how that surveillance would be conducted, as
145. United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1021 (1988). Accord Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1981).
146. Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 117. See also Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d
577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983).
147. Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 118.
148. Amen, 831 F.2d at 379.
149. Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581.
150. Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 281-282 (1st Cir. 1993).
151. Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1992).
152. See Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581. See also Deal, 980 F.2d at 1157.
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required by the First Circuit in Williams.' Even less tenable would be
the suggestion that one "audio monitoring on premises" sign would instill
in customers "considerably more than a mere expectation" that their
conversations would be subjected to surveillance.1" While the question
is fact specific, the wire cases where consent has been implied from
circumstances have involved "far more compelling facts"155 than the ones
presented by Dunkin' Donuts. In the absence of valid claims of either party
status or implied consent, the electronic surveillance performed by Dunkin'
Donuts constitutes a prohibited interception within the meaning of Title III.
C. Has Dunkin' Donuts Intentionally Intercepted the Oral
Communications of its Customers?
Both criminal and civil liability under Title III require intentional
conduct by Dunkin' Donuts in its nonconsensual interception of oral
communications.15 6 Dunkin' Donuts has the requisite culpability to incur
liability under the statute.
1. Intentional Conduct Requires a Conscious Objective
Title III's state-of-mind requirement resulted from an amendment to
Section 2511(1)(a) by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(Privacy Act), 5 7 which substituted the word "intentionally" for "willful-
ly." 58 According to the legislative history of the Privacy Act, intentional
conduct for Title III purposes requires a conscious objective to engage in
the conduct or cause the result. 15 9 Intentional conduct is, therefore, the
equivalent of purposeful conduct under the Model Penal Code."6
Senate Report No. 541 clearly states that the change in the required
mental state from "willfully" to "intentionally" was meant to "underscore
that inadvertent interceptions are not crimes under the Electronic Communi-
153. Williams, 11 F.3d at 281-82.
154. See Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 118 (lst Cir. 1981).
155. Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1994).
157. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986).
158. Id. at § 101(f), 100 Stat. 1853.
159. S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 23 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.-
C.A.N. 3555, 3577.
160. (a) Purposely. "A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is
his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (Official Draft 1962).
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cations Privacy Act.""' However, the Report further explains that the
change in mental states "addresses the concerns of radio scanners that in
the course of scanning radio frequencies in order to receive public
communications, one could inadvertently tune through a protected
communication like a cellular telephone call." 62
Dunkin' Donuts suggested that it installed audio equipment to
intercept only its employees' conversations.163 Any other interceptions,
Dunkin' Donuts might claim, were the product of inadvertence rather than
intentional acts. As a result, they would not fall within the prohibitions of
Section 2511(1)(a). The Dunkin' Donuts interceptions, however, do not fit
within the categories of inadvertence suggested by the legislative history of
the Privacy Act or the subsequent case law construing Title I.
Dunkin' Donuts installed equipment that had not only the capacity to
record both employee and customer conversations but an inability to
distinguish between them. Having done so, Dunkin' Donuts acknowledges
the possibility that customer conversations could be intercepted as well."
While that might at first blush appear analogous to the situation of radio
scanners, the difference lies in one critical fact: If Dunkin' Donuts made
nonconsensual interceptions of employee conversations, it, unlike one
scanning through radio frequencies, intentionally engaged in prohibited
conduct at the time of the inadvertent interceptions. A lawsuit filed in New
Hampshire on behalf of Dunkin' Donuts employees and customers alleges
that employee conversations were, in fact, intercepted without consent. 165
Title III simply will not allow Dunkin' Donuts to distinguish between
contemplated and actual results. Senate Report No. 541 uses the disjunctive
"or" when defining intentional conduct as being an objective purpose either
to do an act or cause a harm."6 If Dunkin' Donuts had the requisite
intent to intercept oral communications without consent, it makes no
difference that the "wrong" conversations-those of customers as opposed
to employees-were actually intercepted. Nor does this fact affect the
analysis under the Model Penal Code: It affords no legal significance to a
divergence between actual and contemplated results when the only
161. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 159, at U.S.C.C.A.N. 3577.
162. Id. at U.S.C.C.A.N. 3560.
163. See Agreement Letter, supra note 22, at 2.
164. Id.
165. Hodgdon v. Dunkin' Donuts, No. 94-C-00868 (N.H. Super. Ct. for the N. Dist.
of Hilisborough County filed Aug. 5, 1995) [hereinafter Hodgdon (Class action suit filed
on behalf of two former Dunkin' Donuts employees and various customers alleging non
consensual interceptions of both employee and customer conversations in New Hampshire
stores. Settlement pending pursuant to Aug. 29, 1995 docket entry.).
166. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 159, at U.S.C.C.A.N. 3577.
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consequence of the divergence is that a different person or property has
been affected.167 Accordingly, a claim of inadvertence as to the particular
conversations intercepted by Dunkin' Donuts has no legal significance as
it relates to the requisite state of mind under Section 2511(1)(a).
Further, the Dunkin' Donuts scenario does not establish the kind of
inadvertence protected in the case of Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corporation,
where an unknown design defect in a telephone voice logger resulted in the
microphone transmission of telephone and other conversations after the
logger had been deactivated.168 Dunkin' Donuts cannot claim inadver-
tence to defeat the intent element of Section 2511(1)(a).
2. Intentional Conduct Does Not Consider Underlying Motive
Neither can Dunkin' Donuts rely upon a lack of bad purpose to escape
liability under Title Im. While willful conduct took into account the
interceptor's motive, intentional conduct does not, as evidenced by the
legislative history of the Privacy Act. Senate Report No. 541 states,
"Liability for intentionally engaging in prohibited conduct is not dependent
on an assessment of the merit of the motive .. "169 Thus, intent refers
only to the actor's state of mind in making the interceptions. In this
respect, the Privacy Act signifies a change in the required mental state by
substituting "intentionally" for "willfully."17
Senate Report No. 1097, which accompanied Title HI as enacted,
referred to the Supreme Court's standard for willful conduct in the criminal
context.171 Under the Murdock standard, "[W]hen used in a criminal
statute, it [willful] generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without
justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely."" 7 Thus, the
167. Section (2)(a) provides:
(2) When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an
element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not
within the purpose or the contemplation of the actor unless:
(a) the actual result differs from that designed or contem-
plated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person or
different property is injured or affected ....
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 note on subsection (2)(a) (Official Draft 1962).
168. Sanders, 38 F.3d 736, 742-43 (4th Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, No. 93-2423, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 1439 (4th Cir., Jan. 24, 1995) (en banc).
169. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 159, at U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578.
170. Under the Model Penal Code, "willfully" means "knowingly," absent a legislative
purpose to impose further requirements. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 explanatory note for
subsection (8) (Official Draft 1962). As will be seen, some courts have found a legislative
purpose to impose a motive requirement.
171. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 159, at U.S.C.C.A.N 3577-78.
172. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933) (cited in Citron v. Citron,
722 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984) (holding that the
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concept of willful behavior as defined by some courts included a consider-
ation of the underlying motive.'7 For those courts, willful conduct meant
intent plus a bad purpose. That a willful state of mind could require an
undesirable motive receives support from cases where the triers of fact
found intentional interceptions but no willful behavior. This lack of a
willful component to an intentional act of interception developed in cases
of spousal wiretapping when the intercepting party believed in the legality
of his or her actions. 74 While Dunkin' Donuts has claimed such a
belief," it was not formed upon the advice of legal counsel. 76 Nor is
that belief relevant to the inquiry of "intentional" interceptions under
Section 251 1(1)(a).17
Regardless of its motive in intercepting conversations or its belief in
the legality of those interceptions, Dunkin' Donuts evinces the requisite
intent under Section 2511(1)(a). For Title m purposes, Dunkin' Donuts
intentionally intercepted its customers' conversations.
V. PROBLEMS WITH TITLE IT[ ENFORCEMENT
This Note demonstrates that the audio surveillance employed by
Dunkin' Donuts and similar businesses violates the letter and spirit of Title
I. Unfortunately, the discovery of surreptitious audio surveillance does
not guarantee that the statutory prohibitions will be enforced.
criminal standard of willfulness, and its traditional meaning, would apply in both criminal
and civil contexts alike). See also Malouche v. JH Management Co., 839 F.2d 1024, 1025-
26 (4th Cir. 1988).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 987 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding
the conviction of an Orange County, Vermont, sheriff for the nonconsensual interception
of his employees' telephone conversations. The court concluded that amended Section
2511(1)(a) "only requires intentional interception of communications, not willful intercep-
tion. The question of whether the defendant had a good or evil purpose . . . is, therefore,
irrelevant.") (emphasis added).
174. See Farroni v. Farroni, 862 F.2d 109, 110-11 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
husband's secret recordings of his wife's telephone conversations with third parties were
intentional but not willful interceptions due to his belief that his actions were lawful. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed judgment for the husband in this action by his wife for civil damages
under § 2520.) See also Citron v. Citron, 722 F.2d 14, 14-15. In both cases, the
intercepting parties sought and relied upon the advice of legal counsel.
175. See Agreement Letter, supra note 22, at 1.
176. Id.
177. Unlike § 2511(1)(a) and (b), §§ 2511(1)(c) and (d) prohibit intentional disclosure
and use respectively of the contents of an intercepted communication. Those sections, as
written and construed, require a greater degree of knowledge by the defendant than does
§ 2511(1)(a). They require as an element of the offense that the defendant knew or should
have known facts that would suggest the illegal nature of the interception. Forsyth v. Barr,
19 F.3d 1527, 1538, n. 21 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 195 (1994). Motive,
however, is no longer a consideration under these sections.
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After the enactment of Title Ill, Congress established a National
Wiretap Commission (Commission) to study its enforcement. A 1976
Report of the Commission found that the enforcement of Title. m1 against
private actors proved difficult for reasons that still exist today.178 Those
reasons include (1) victim reluctance to report offenses and incur additional
privacy losses; (2) judicial reluctance to apply Title II's severe civil
penalties; (3) jury reluctance to convict individuals who claim as their
motivation a desire to uncover wrongdoing; and (4) the shortage of
enforcement personnel.17 9 In addition, the obstacle imposed by the
judicial system in its narrow interpretation of the statute has not been
removed." 8 As a result, Title III's enforcement was, and still is, "disap-
pointing. "181
Congress has yet to amend Title I, as the Commission suggested, to
include misdemeanor penalties "to encourage conviction by ambivalent
juries.""8 However, Congress has significantly increased the amount of
civil damages recoverable under Title III, which the Commission
recommended to "encourage individual lawsuits against violators. " "
While such lawsuits may now be encouraged, it remains unclear that they
will produce a corresponding benefit to the plaintiffs who initiate them.
The Privacy Act significantly amended the provisions for civil
damages under Section 2520 by increasing the minimum statutory damages
from $1000 to $10,000 for violations other than certain satellite video
communications offenses." Section 2520 now provides:
(2) [T]he court may assess as damages whichever is the greater
of- (A) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff
and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation;
or
(B) statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100
a day for each day of violation or $10,000.'
Accompanying that increase in statutory damages, however, came a change
from the mandatory "shall" to the permissive "may" in the trial court's
directive."6 In response, the circuits have split on whether courts now
178. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REvIEw OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, 1976 ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE REPORT (1976) [hereinafter NWC Report].
179. Id. at 23.
180. Id. at 24.
181. Id. at 23.
182. Id. at xviii.
183. Id.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2) (1994).
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 159, at U.S.C.C.A.N. 3581.
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have the discretion to decline an award of damages.1" The majority view
clearly favors trial court discretion, but neither interpretation bodes well for
the effective enforcement of Title I. Under the majority view, those
courts reluctant to impose hefty civil damages now have the option to
award only actual damages-which are often de minimis-or none at all.
While that option could lead to more plaintiffs' verdicts, such a victory
remains hollow at best. The possibility of a zero or negligible dollar
judgment provides little incentive to plaintiffs and even less deterrent to
those who would engage in prohibited surveillance. Further, plaintiffs must
litigate in courts having the discretion to conclude that a damage award
"would serve no purpose."88 On the other hand, the minority view
exacerbates the problem of judicial reluctance, particularly now that the
civil penalties have been greatly enhanced.
This leaves only the normal prosecutorial policy of responding to
complaints of illegal eavesdropping, which the Commission found
unsatisfactory."s9 While such a policy appears to have succeeded in the
case of Dunkin' Donuts, the public cannot rest assured that all inquiries
will result in similar cooperation. Local Dunkin' Donuts franchisees
reportedly ceased their audio surveillance within hours of a request made
by the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office."9 Yet even in its
cooperation, Dunkin' Donuts exemplifies the lawlessness associated with
covert audio surveillance in such businesses. Dunkin' Donuts Incorporated
knew nothing about the use of audio surveillance in its franchises until the
nwspper stories appeared, accoling to company spolman Wiliam Chiccaelli' 91-
Dunkin' Donuts Incorporated responded to those media reports by sending
a Western Union Mailgram "requesting that all franchisees with such audio
devices disconnect and remove the devices from their shops."" g Corpo-
187. See, e.g., Nalley v. Nalley, 53 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
change from a mandatory to permissive verb form signaled congressional intent that trial
courts have the discretion to award or decline damages to civil plaintiffs under § 2520-
(c)(2)). But see Rodgers v. Wood, 910 F.2d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 914
F.2d 260 (1990) (refusing to "infer that Congress intended to increase the penalties for
violations, but to permit defendants to escape the increased penalties if their actions did not
warrant too severe a sanction." Id.).
188. Nally, 53 F.3d at 654 (refusing to award damages against a wife who intercepted
her husband's telephone calls to another woman and then played the tape recordings for the
couple's children, the other woman's husband, and the plaintiff's attorney).
189. NWC Report, supra note 178, at 23.
190. Telephone Interview with Walter L. Maroney, supra note 28.
191. Coakley & Murphy, supra note 2, at 6.
192. Letter from Catherine Spalding, Staff Attorney for Dunkin' Donuts Incorporated,
to Walter Marone [sic], Assistant Attorney General, New Hampshire Consumer Protection
Division, (May 27, 1994) (on file with the State of New Hampshire, Department of Justice,
Office of the Attorney General, Concord, NH).
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rate Dunkin' Donuts offered the public a mere request that its franchisees
desist from using audio surveillance. Worse yet, that request is one with
which franchise owners have no obligation to comply."9
Despite the statutory prohibitions, enforcement difficulties have
rendered Title III ineffective in pulling the plug on private-sector bugs.
CONCLUSION
Dunkin' Donuts and similar businesses offer three reasons for their
use of covert audio surveillance: (1) to monitor customer service,' 94 (2)
to prevent quick-change scams, 95 and (3) to keep employees from
pocketing a quarter here and there.196 While these remain valid manage-
ment objectives, they hardly compare to the serious crime for which Title
I authorizes court-approved interceptions by law enforcement.' 97 Title
HI established national standards to be strictly construed by the courts. It
also established a blanket prohibition, with three specific exceptions, upon
electronic surveillance performed by anyone other than authorized law
enforcement. Businesses such as Dunkin' Donuts do not satisfy any of
those exceptions, and Congress did not intend otherwise.
However, some twenty-five years after the enactment of Title HI,
electronic surveillance invades the public spheres of daily life. As G.
Gordon Liddy said of the Watergate break-in, "[S]urveillance is like
brushing your teeth . . . . It's basic." 98 It is so basic-and insidious-
that the subject of an interception often remains unaware of the intrusion.
The audio surveillance at Dunkin' Donuts emphasizes this point. Mere
happenstance, in the form of curiosity from a hungry investigator, brought
the prohibited practices to light.
This knowledge offers no comfort to the customers who visit their
neighborhood Dunkin' Donuts for a cup of dark-roast coffee and perhaps
one of corporate America's favorite jelly-filled doughnuts.' 99 They may
193. Dunkin' Donuts routinely eavesdropped, HOUSTON POST, May 29, 1994, at A10.
However, Chiccarelli indicated his belief that "with all the adverse publicity, we are
confident they will comply." Id.
194. Telephone Interview with Walter L. Maroney, supra note 28.
195. Id.
196. Kilborn, supra note 5, at 6.
197. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994). At the state level, for example, application for
interception may be made by law enforcement in cases involving evidence of murder,
kidnapping, robbery, extortion, bribery, gambling, dealing in narcotics, and other felonies
"dangerous to life, limb, or property." Id. at § 2516(2).
198. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 43 (quoting G. Gordon Liddy's conversation with
Mike Wallace).
199. The next five national favorites for corporate America are honey-dipped, chocolate
honey-dipped, plain, "kreme," and chocolate frosted. Robert A. Mamis, Doughnut Figures,
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derive some solace, however, from the fact that the New Hampshire
Attorney General's Office found no evidence of surveillance abuse during
its Dunkin' Donuts investigation." Still, one favorable report will not
quash the fears that arise from the mere suggestion that the contents of
private coffee klatches have been picked up by a furtive bug and carried to
a remote location where unseen managers and even employees can overhear
them." That mere suggestion appeared to be grounded in fact when a
former three-year employee of a Manchester, New Hampshire, Dunkin'
Donuts told the media that she and fellow employees eavesdropped on
customers' coffee talk, especially when it concerned intimate details about
people they knew. Admitting that those details were circulated throughout
the store, Tammy O'Neal, who was fired in 1992, said eavesdropping
employees "would make fun of people's private lives. "I
Before they resort to breaking the law with covert electronic
surveillance, businesses should consider the words of former President
Richard Nixon. Discussing the practice of wiretapping with John Dean,
Nixon offered some hindsight applicable here: "They [the taps] never
helped us. Just gobs and gobs of material: gossip and bullshitting .
.. ". The practice of electronic spying connotes a war mentality that
not only thinks in terms of enemies,' but which mocks the philosophy
of Dunkin' Donuts and similar establishments. "We're in the business of
satisfying customers," said Chiccarelli. 5 Those customers, he noted,
have expressed their concern about the surveillance.'
Customers express their concern with good reason. Spy gear has
become a multimillion-dollar industry that provides the public with access
to increasingly smaller and more powerful equipment once available only
to law enforcement.' For those businesses that choose to utilize such
equipment, they can do so lawfully by providing notice sufficient to
establish consent. This does not mean a warning sticker that is "roughly
one-third of the size of the sign" directly above it that reads "No shirt, no
INc., Oct. 1993, at 48, 48.
200. Telephone Interview with Walter L. Maroney, supra note 28.
201. Dallas Gatewood, Now Big Brother Is Listening, Too. Store surveillance raises
concern, NEWSDAY, May 28, 1994, at A17.
202. Id. Tammy O'Neal is a plaintiff in the Hodgdon lawsuit. See Hodgdon, supra note
165.
203. See ScHWARTz, supra note 10, at 39.
204. Id. at 43.
205. Coakley & Murphy, supra note 2, at 6.
206. Id.
207. James C. McKinley, Jr., U.S. Agents Raid Stores in 24 Cities to Seize Spy Gear,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6, 1995, at Al, B5.
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shoes, no service. " " Rather, it means a sign that will capture the
customer's attention. When it does just that, businesses can listen to the
sound of silence as customers take their patronage elsewhere. Bugs are a
filthy business indeed. The dirt they carry has no place in a doughnut shop.
208. Hodgdon, supra note 165.
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